Tag Archives: UN commission

Max Frei-Sulzer vs. the United Nations Commission, 1962

It is a special feeling to contribute to the efforts of Vlado’s mother and sister, who saved every newspaper clipping on the investigation into the 1961 crash, and to see these efforts pay off decades later in the most recent 2026 UN report. The NYT article shown below is the only article to mention Dr. M. Frei-Sulzer, a Swiss police official who was “appointed by the commission to examine the wreckage of the Secretary-General’s plane”. Thank you to Chief Justice Othman, and all those assisting him, who took my criticism of Frei-Sulzer seriously and found “a series of telegrams exchanged between members of the United Nations Commission[…]” giving evidence of “[…] opposition from members of the Commission to Frei-Sulzer’s conclusions and differences in views among some of them. It was questioned whether Frei-Sulzer’s report should be published at all.” Not surprising, when Justice Othman requested information in 2025 from Switzerland on Frei-Sulzer, they found “no results from searches in the Zurich City Archives.”

From “Valuing the Evidence of Harold Julien: Part Two”, published here on January 20, 2024:

NYT, 3 May 1962, “Cause of Hammarskjold Crash Still a Mystery as Inquiry Ends”:

“[…] Dr. M. Frei-Sulzer, a Swiss police official, who was appointed by the commission to examine the wreckage of the Secretary-General’s plane, which crashed near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, attributed the disaster to the plane’s low altitude as it approached the airfield at Ndola after it had been cleared by the tower for landing.” [Note: The Albertina was equipped with radar! -T.B.] […] “Dr. Frei-Sulzer reported that “the only abnormal fact was the dangerously low altitude of the aircraft in relation to the airport elevation, probably due to human failure.” Dr. Frei-Sulzer is chief of the scientific department of the Zurich police and professor of science at the University of Zurich.” […] “The commission, which was appointed by the General Assembly last October, completed its report in Geneva March 8, three weeks before Dr. Frei-Sulzer submitted his findings to it.” […] “The [UN] commission criticized Rhodesian authorities for the fact that the wreckage was not found until fifteen hours after the crash. It said that Harold Julien, a United Nations guard who died several days after the crash, would have had a better chance for survival if the Rhodesians had shown more diligence. A report by the Royal Medical Board of Sweden said that a post-mortem indicated that, contrary to reports at the time, the “Secretary General lived for a certain period of time after the crash.” It said that he was the only person aboard the plane who had completely escaped burns.” […] “The Rhodesian and Swedish doctors agreed that bullets found in bodies of Mr. Hammarskjold’s guards had been exploded by the fire that consumed the wreckage and had not been fired from a weapon. Their findings were supplemented by Dr. Frei-Sulzer, who reported that there were no bullet holes in the plane and no evidence of explosives that would have been needed for a time bomb or other means of sabotaging the plane. However, the United Nations Commission examined at length the question whether a Fouga Magister fighter plane of the Katanga forces, “which had been operating against the United Nations in Katanga,” or some other plane [Note: De Havilland Dove. T.B.], had shot down the United Nations craft. It noted the reports of the Rhodesian inquiry board that the plane did not have sufficient range to fly from its base at Kolwezi and that the pilot had stated that it was on the ground on the night of the tragedy.”

Who was Dr. Max Frei-Sulzer? It is hard to take him seriously, considering that he investigated the authenticity of the Shroud of Turin, and he believed that Hitler’s diaries were real; and another case, which resulted in the imprisonment of an innocent man, who was released after 12 years!

From “Valuing the Evidence of Harold Julien: Part Three”, published here on June 11, 2024:

As I pointed out in part two of this series, Hugo Blandori was a “retired” FBI agent, turned private investigator, who was hired by the UN as a consultant to this investigation. It is extremely upsetting to me that an FBI agent was involved, not only because of the racist history of that organization, but because of the role the FBI played during the McCarthy witch-hunt on United Nations staff members in 1953. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, gave the FBI carte blanche of headquarters “for the convenience”, and it was his successor Dag Hammarskjold who protected his staff and kicked out the FBI by November 1953. Within every organization, including the UN, there have always been members who are actively working against the good that that organization is trying to achieve, and that is how I believe Hugo Blandori got the job of consultant. This is also how Dr. Max Frei-Sulzer – a Swiss police official that believed Hitler’s diaries were real – was appointed by the UN commission to examine the wreckage of the Secretary-General’s plane, and “who reported that there were no bullet holes in the plane and no evidence of explosives that would have been needed for a time bomb or other means of sabotaging the plane”. In my view, the contributions of Blandori and Frei-Sulzer are not just highly suspect, they discredit the investigation – I believe intentionally so!

From the 2026 report of Chief Justice Othman (A/80/815):

Page 4: “Switzerland promptly made inquiries in response to my request concerning the possible location of metallurgical test materials.”

Page 36-37; para. 158-160:

“The Mattei case and the crash of SE-BDY share several notable features. Both aircraft crashed during the landing approach with landing gear deployed. Both crashes initially received official verdicts of accident. The analysis of Mattei’s plane crash occurred despite the passage of time and despite the fact that much of the original wreckage had been destroyed by remelting, following the original court ruling of accidental death.

Additionally, both Mattei and Hammarskjöld received OAS death threats in mid-1961, and both died in aircraft crashes within approximately a year of those threats. The Mayor of Evian had also been killed by an OAS-attributed plastic explosive attack in March 1961.

The United Nations Commission’s metallurgical expert, Max Frei-Sulzer, conducted tests on recovered fragments and did not find evidence of foreign substances indicating sabotage. The forensic methodology used in the Mattei case was not available at that time. Further, limitations on Frei-Sulzer’s analysis included that it was limited to the small percentage (around 20 per cent) of the wreckage that remained after the aircraft caught fire. Additionally, as analysed in section III.D
below, it appears that the members of the United Nations Commission had different opinions regarding whether Frei-Sulzer’s report should be relied upon or agreed with at all.”

Page 37; para. 163-165:

“In contrast to the Mattei case, the SE-BDY wreckage was severely damaged by post-crash fire, which destroyed 75 to 80 per cent of the fuselage. During the initial inquiries, fused metal parts of the remaining wreckage were remelted and tested by an expert at a local foundry; evidence of suspect foreign materials was not located. A limited number of additional fragments were taken to Switzerland for analysis by Frei-Sulzer, the expert using the forensic resources of the Zurich police, with similar results. After the conclusion of the work of the United Nations Commission, it appears
that, on 22 and 23 August 1962, the remnants of the wreckage were “removed from [the] hanger and buried at Ndola airport”, where they remain. Whether any surviving fragments of SE-BDY exist in a condition suitable for analysis of the type conducted by Firrao in the Mattei case is as yet uncertain.

There have been, over time, calls for a retesting of any wreckage that remains using modern technology, such as X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS). The purpose of a re-examination of any remaining wreckage would include ascertaining whether adjoining key metal parts of the landing mechanism (including the hydraulics junction box) was affected by foreign substances that may be indicators of sabotage. For such an analysis, it would be necessary to first identify any remaining material. Given that much of the fuselage was burned in the crash and some of the remaining
wreckage melted in subsequent tests, together with the degrading effects of the passing of time since, there may be insufficient material remaining that is capable of conclusive testing and determination.

In 2025, I requested assistance from Switzerland to locate records, physical remnants or archives relating to Frei-Sulzer’s work. The request was answered helpfully, but with no results from searches in the Zurich City Archives.”

Pages 56-57; para. 282-289:

“Contemporaneous documents show that the Rhodesian authorities discussed, at the highest levels, the desirability of avoiding the convening of a separate United Nations Commission and, when it was clear that one would be convened, sought to “cultivate” the Commissioners and steer the outcome towards pilot error. Other information showed that British officials sought and obtained revisions to the draft report of the United Nations Commission in advance of its publication, with a similar
aim of ruling out sabotage or external attack as a cause of the crash. On this basis, it was established that the United Kingdom and Northern Rhodesia were concerned about ensuring that a conclusion of pilot error being the cause of the crash was reached in 1961/62, rather than merely permitting an impartial analysis to occur.

In 2026, United Nations archives staff identified additional documents of potential relevance to this inquiry. The documents do not address external influence on the early inquiries, but rather the consensus nature of the conclusions reached by the United Nations Commission. For consistency, they are considered in this section.

Documentation recently identified in United Nations archives includes a series of telegrams exchanged between members of the United Nations Commission following the publication of the Commission’s report and the subsequent receipt of the metallurgical analysis conducted by Frei-Sulzer.

The documentation records that the report of the United Nations Commission had been criticized because it declined to exclude attack and sabotage as possible causes of the crash. It outlines 10 specific grounds on which the Commission’s refusal to exclude sabotage and attack is supported by expert opinion and evidence. These include the following: (a) that the initial draft report prepared by the Rhodesian Board of Investigation had itself concluded that attack and sabotage should not be ruled out and that other possible causes should not be given a higher order of priority; (b) that
the final report of the Board also stated that the willful act of some person or persons unknown could not be ruled out, though it attributed the probable cause to other possibilities (this was a departure from the initial draft that had not been accepted by the United Nations observers); (c) that J. P. Fournier of the International Civil Aviation Organization stated categorically when interviewed by the Commission that he “did not in any way exclude the possibility of sabotage”; (d) that the Rhodesian engineering expert agreed that sabotage could not be ruled out; (e) that anonymous
threats had been made against the Secretary-General, the latest of which was reported to have been in Leopoldville in the days before the crash; (f) that an opportunity for sabotage existed when the plane was left unguarded before its departure from Leopoldville; (g) that Julien (the sole temporary survivor) spoke of an explosion; (h) that several reliable witnesses reported seeing flashes in the sky, at times varying by several minutes, with some experts raising the question of whether this could
indicate an explosion in the air before the crash; (i) that at least five persons reported seeing a second plane flying near the Secretary-General’s plane just before the crash, with some claiming the second plane was attacking it; and (j) that an attempt was later made to sabotage another United Nations plane at Kitona by filing the control lines that operate on take-off and landing.

The information thus defends the United Nations Commission’s findings, given that if the Commission had wished to take a political approach, it could have “played up” testimony that supported an external attack or sabotage. In this regard, the information indicates that an external attack and sabotage were each considered to be credible hypotheses at the time.

Frei-Sulzer’s report was received after the United Nations Commission had drafted its report. The documentation records that the Commission’s report was drafted on the assumption that Frei-Sulzer’s tests would be negative; the new factor from Frei-Sulzer’s report was “not the scientific results of his tests, but the sweeping conclusions which he drew”. The documentation records opposition from members of the Commission to Frei-Sulzer’s conclusions and differences in views among some of them. It was questioned whether Frei-Sulzer’s report should be published at all.

I am grateful for the identification of this documentation, which adds a significant primary source to the record of the United Nations Commission’s deliberations. Three matters are of particular note. The first is that the Commission faced attempted influence from Member States when preparing, and after the publication of, its report. This relates to the findings discussed in previous reports that more than one Government had sought to influence the early inquiries towards a predetermined finding of pilot error.

The second matter of note is that the findings of Frei-Sulzer were not universally accepted by the United Nations Commission members; the consensus position appears to have been to publish his report as an annexure without further commentary, rather than criticize it or otherwise reconvene the Commission to provide individual opinions about it. The telegram record confirms that at least two members were against modifying the Commission’s conclusions in light of Frei-Sulzer’s findings,
with one going so far as to prefer that the findings not be published at all.”