I am a bit slow in posting the latest Hammarskjold investigation news, but here is the link to the 2022 UN report from Judge Othman, which was released at the beginning of November. Many thanks to Judge Othman, and to all “individual researchers and non-State entities” who have been responsible for providing “almost all new information generated between 2020 and 2022”. From page 9 of the report: “Despite the decrease in the amount of information identified by Member States, the amount and quality of new information provided by individuals and non-State entities highlights that additional information is highly likely to exist in Key Member States’ records and archives.” As a reminder, those “Key Member States” are the Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. From page 34 of the report: “…a small number of Member States, which have been identified as being almost certain to hold relevant information, appear to have been the least willing to provide further disclosure.”
From the Fabry archive, I have recently discovered a new stack of international newspapers from the 19th-27th of September 1961. Here are two papers from London, both from the 19th of September:
Many thanks to Madame Rime, and to Maurin Picard for this interview and supporting the Hammarskjold investigation, and to David Glaser for promoting this blog and the life of Vlado Fabry – merci beaucoup to all who have contributed to this site!
Interview with Monique Rime Cégel
3 May 2020
– Monique Cégel, 83, was Vladimir Fabry’s secretary in Leopoldville in 1961
– She worked at the Hotel Le Royal between December 1960 and January 1962
– She knew Alice Lalande and Harold Julien very well
– She was working extra hours on 17 September 1961
– She typed Dag Hammarskjöld’s last message to Paul Henri Spaak, requesting Belgium to stop « van Riessenghem »
– She remembers there were serious doubts about UN communications being intercepted
– Vladimir Fabry did most of the research regarding Katanga mercenaries during the summer of 1961
– She remembers Dag Hammarskjöld’s collaborators tried to deter him from flying unescorted
– She does not think Sture Linnér was intended to fly along, as he had to stay in Leopoldville to liaise and work proper transmissions
– She flew to Ndola with Mahmoud Khiary on 19 September 1961 to type the ceasefire agreement with Moise Tshombe
– She saw the crash site right above her plane window prior to landing and was horrified
– She recalls smoldering debris and the « long line » of burnt forest
– She found a very hostile atmosphere in Northern Rhodesia
– She met a very disdainful Lord Alport
– She was not allowed to join Mahmoud Khiary at the hospital to visit Harold Julien
* * *
I was Vladimir Fabry’s secretary, at the Hotel Le Royal, Leopoldville (Congo).
I worked there for the UN mission in Congo from December 1960 to January 1962, as secretary detached from the Atomic Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.
I kept working for the UN in Geneva until 1976, mostly through freelancing contracts. Then my husband and I moved to the city of Bulle.
I met my husband in 1961 in Congo!
He was a representative for major Swiss companies of the time, including Schindler and Vega, and was selling chemical products to the university of Lovanium.
I became a Swiss citizen, after getting married with him.
I was French (and I still am), and was born in Paris.
* Sunday 17 September 1961
At the Hotel Le Royal, we had an office adjacent to the one occupied by Sture Linnér.
On the day Dag Hammarskjöld took off from Leopoldville, that Sunday, I was not supposed to work.
But, as Fabry’s secretary, and since he only worked with me, they sent some military staff in a Jeep to pick me up and bring me back to Le Royal.
They found me sitting at a cafe terrace, since I believe they always kept an eye on us for safety.
I went back to my office and worked all afternoon, until the plane departed.
* Vladimir Fabry
That day, when I arrived at my office, Vladimir Fabry immediately requested to dictate some telegrams. I spent the whole afternoon doing that: typing messages, then bringing them to the « Chiffre » for them to be coded accordingly with the recipient’s identity.
By the time I was finished, they were getting ready to leave for the airport.
Before leaving, Vladimir Fabry was so thrilled.
Happy as a kid who was just offered a new toy.
Albeit a very reserved character, he was practically jumping on his feet.
He came into my office and said excitingly:
« Monique, I am leaving with the Secretary-General! I am trusting you with my car keys! »
He had to be very happy, for he would never have done such a thing otherwise.
His car was an official UN vehicle.
He told me I could use all the time during his absence.
God knows Leopoldville is a very large town, with great distances between the various locations.
I used the car until, of course, I handed it back to the UN, since Fabry never returned.
I remember seeing their cars leaving Le Royal in convoy.
I went through these events with an innocent mind as I could only partially grasp what was going.
I would mostly type messages dictated by Fabry, messages that were generally meant for New York.
The last message I typed from them was dictated by M. Hammarskjöld himself. The recipient was Paul-Henri Spaak.
(nota: the Belgian Foreign Minister)
But I cannot remember its content (nota: requesting Belgian assistance to put an end to the criminal deeds of a mercenary pilot named « van Riessenghem »).
I was so intimidated that I must have skipped two or three words he dictated.
I had never met Hammarskjöld and I was so young then (nota : she was 24).
I saw Dag Hammarskjöld every day between 13 and 17 September 1961, since he occupied Sture Linnér’s office.
* Can you recall Hammarskjöld’s state of mind?
I remember he was not very agreeable. He seemed really sad, not at all in a communicative mood. « You do this, this has to be done ». We were in the midst of a serious crisis with Katanga, obviously.
* Were there long sleepless nights at Le Royal?
I did not spend those ones with them, but I had a similar experience during the previous months. When you are assigned to someone high ranking, you did not count your days and your nights. With all the crises we went through, there were many sleepless nights at Le Royal.
* Harold Julien
I knew Harold Julien very well, as he was the Chief Security Officer in Leopoldville. Being M. Fabry’s secretary, I was granted the use of a car.
This in turn created some serious trouble, because we were taken hostage with a Swiss colleague of mine by Mobutu’s troops for 24 hours. The time was around end January or early February 1961.
They had spotted my car, I believe, due to the UN flags on it, and surrounded our house with two small armoured cars. There were rumors that the UN was bent on disarming the Congolese National Army. And we had been poorly inspired to move in a house across the street from Mobutu’s barracks along the river – a magnificent location, it was indeed.
Then the witchhunt began against all UN staff.
This is the only time in my life I was really scared.
I called the French embassy asking for their help, as I was a French citizen. Their answer was very … kind: « you work for the UN, hence you are no longer considered as a French citizen for us. There is nothing we can do for you ».
Since my colleague was Swiss, she called the Swiss embassy and they immediately answered. « Yes of course, we will come and rescue you ».
They arranged for a motorized convoy of Swiss people, with friends and colleagues of my future husband, led by the Red Cross delegate M. Olivet, who was killed another day.
(nota: Georges Olivet, 34, was killed in an ambulance on 12 December 1961, amidst heavy fighting in Elisabethville, Katanga)
They parlayed with Mobutu’s soldiers, who pretty quickly removed their blockade and let us go free.
* Saturday 16 September, Lord Lansdowne meets Dag Hammarskjöld. Did you get word of a stormy exchange?
No, I do not remember that gentleman.
I did not hear anything, although I was there that day and was working in the nearby room. If there had been loud voices, a shouting match,
I would have heard something.
But it does not mean it did not take place, as my memory could be failing me.
There were indeed many high ranking visitors in Sture Linnér’s office, and I did not always necessarily get a look at them.
* Did Dag Hammarskjöld’s collaborators try to deter him from flying unescorted?
That is true, since I remember I heard about it.
They did try to deter him.
There were rumors that they were « waiting » for him in Katanga. There were Tshombe’s two Fougas.
(nota: in September 1961, the UN still believed two remaining Fouga were operational, as there was actually only one left, « 93 », the other one bing grounded awaiting spare parts)
When we heard about the crash, we immediately thought: « Tshombe’s Fougas did it ».
Personnally, I just could not imagine such a thing: who would want to shoot down the UN Secretary General?
I really thought this was just an accident, at least until after I left Congo early 1962.
If I had known … I was so scared in the air. I could never have boarded a plane.
But since I had no clue of what happened, I departed very easily when told to, without any further stress.
* Was Sture Linnér supposed to join the mission and fly along with Dag Hammarskjöld, as he later commented?
I was not at Ndjili airport but I would be surprised if he was intending to fly with them. It was logical for him to stay in Leo and liaise. That would be surprising if true.
Alice Lalande, she had to be part of the travelling party, since she was in charge of sensitive equipments, these Enigma machines. Besides, the Secretary-General needed an assistant like her. In her daily job, Alice was handing over paperwork to all the secretaries. She was a perfectly bilingual Canadian.
* Did Dag Hammarskjöld know that UN communications were intercepted?
I do not know, but it was a serious question for everyone in Leopoldville.
I had worked for weeks with Vladimir Fabry on the issue of the « frightfuls », these mercenaries.
I made dozens of photocopies from these documents that had been somehow collected and that had to do with these mercenaries. Vladimir Fabry worked a great deal on this issue. We did an extensive research on these documents. I am sorry that I did not have enough political awareness, to show an interest in the content of these documents.
* Monday 18 September 1961
Personnally, I did not get word of the crash when I arrived at the office on the next day. The other secretaries were doing a funny face, which was a bit intriguing. I made it late to the office due my long working hours on Sunday. I thought there was a dreadful atmosphere, but nobody told me anything. They did not dare tell me what had happened, probably because I was working so closely with M. Fabry. I only found out the same evening when I came home and my future husband told me: « did you hear what happened to Hammarskjöld ? »
* The crash site
When Mahmoud Khiary took off for Ndola, I came along.
(nota: on Tuesday 19 September 1961, in order to negotiate a ceasefire with Moïse Tshombé, as it was theoretically the case for Dag Hammarskjöld two days earlier)
I boarded the plane with him. If I had known the crash was foul play, I would never have come along with Khiary. This was so sudden, that I did not have the time to bring any equipment, not even a typing machine, as Alice Lalande had done.
We departed for Ndola. Prior to landing, while flying low over the forest, we managed to see the crash site from up close
(nota: the whole area was forested back then)
This memory will stay with me forever.
We spotted the wreckage, these scattered debris of an aircraft, what was left of it. This long line of burnt forest. It was terrible. I am still emotional about it, as I speak. I happened to realize the people I knew so well were only charred remains by now.
Alice Lalande, to begin with, who was basically my boss.
The security officers, such as Harold Julien.
I remember Alice’s dress with the flowery design. It sent cold shivers down my spine when I realized the plane had crashed and burnt that way. I though My God, she must have burnt so quickly. It was terrifying.
* Ndola, 19 September 1961
When we arrived in Ndola, there was this man, Lord Alport, welcoming us – so to say – at the airport. He was very cold. An extremely disagreeable character, very full of himself and every inch a British aristocrat. Still he invited our delegation for lunch in his home. I was just a secretary sitting at the end of the table with the security officers, but I found him disdainful towards us .
(nota : Khiary was not particularly welcome, since Tshombe had notified Linnér he agreed to negotiate a ceasefire with anyone but Khiary, whom he deemed responsible for launching Operation Morthor on 13 September 1961 – which is at least partially true)
Our mission was not very welcome.
Then we headed for the actual ceasefire negotiations with Moïse Tshombe, but I did not directly take part in the negotiations. The British mission there lent me a typing machine, whose keyboards had none of the French accents, which made my task very dfficult. I did however type all the ceasefire documents.
We stayed two or three days in Ndola.
Mahmoud Khiary and the delegation visited Harold Julien in the hospital. I was not allowed to join them.
1961 was a terrible year in my life. Annus horribilis, as the Queen Mother would say.
There was my being taken hostage, then Hammarskjöld’s crash, then the murder of 13 Italian air crew.
(nota: massacred by the crowd who mistook them with Belgian paratroopers in Kindu on 11 or 12 November 1961)
One of them was 25 and a very good friend of mine.
He had been at my wedding two weeks before, on 28 October 1961, along with Sture Linnér’s wife, whom I called Madame Linnér, of course, and also Jacques Poujoulat.
This day of September 1961, this Sunday the 17th. In my old age, I still cannot fathom what unfolded that day. It is still with me. It will stay with me until my last breath.
I was hesitant to share this here, because of the editorial choice of the word “suicide” to describe the death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, but it is important because this was saved in a collection of other international papers by Olinka and Olga Fabry. The political cartoon, showing Moïse Tshombe collecting his money from the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga mines with the murders of Patrice Lumumba and Hammarskjold, is gruesome but on point. From our personal coin collection, not from the Fabry archive, I have also included scans of two coins from Katanga from 1961.
September 17, 2021, will be the 60th anniversary of the plane crash that killed our uncle Vlado, Dag Hammarskjold, and 14 of their brave colleagues while flying on a peace mission to Ndola, and we continue to wait for justice. For this reason, I am especially grateful to those who have no direct connection to the crash, who have made it their mission to help us uncover the truth with independent research and inquiry.
In July of this year, Joseph (Joe) Majerle III shared his own analysis of the crash with all the relatives, and it is an incredibly thoughtful and moving effort to support us. The points he makes deserve serious examination, and I want everyone to read it, so I am publishing it here in full – it offers a new perspective that was eye-opening for me, and lifted my spirits. Thank you, Joe!
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN RHODESIAN REPORT’S ANNEXES II AND III AN D THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT A/5069 PERTAINING TO THE CRASH OF DOUGLAS DC-6B SE-BDY S/N 43559 ON SEPTEMBER 17-18, 1961
By Joseph Majerle III
PREFACE I AM NOT a professional aircraft accident investigator. I am writing this account because after reading the reports of the crash, the professional aircraft accident investigators that were tasked with determining the facts of this tragedy, or for that matter, anyone else that has viewed the evidence contained in the above–mentioned files, have not come forward and pointed out the glaring misperceptions, dismissiveness of obvious real evidence, and inappropriate focus on irrelevancies that shaped the conclusions of the reports. In addition, there is at least one aspect that I can only describe as a deliberate inaccuracy that I consider to be of decisive importance. The Annex III and U.N. A/5069 reports, following the original Board report, did not effectively question the basic premises of the Investigating Board report as presumably would have been their purpose; which is why nearly 60 years after the crash this subject is still very unresolved for a surprising number of people.
I AM PRIMARILY, an aircraft mechanic. But, I earned a private pilot’s license and had begun commercial and instrument flight training before earning any of my mechanics ratings. Before I had any ratings at all, I had already built and flown my first airplane out of salvaged, crashed, repaired and new parts. At this point, I was already self-employed in the aircraft maintenance, salvage and rebuild business. I started salvaging airplanes from crash sites in 1974, studying whatever evidence was left at the scene in an effort to understand what and how the accident happened. With the advent of the Internet and the posting of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports online, I have been able to read many reports going back to at least to the mid 1930’s because I was interested in learning what was known about particular incidents that I had heard about as a youngster, and for well into adulthood.
I decided to abandon thoughts of becoming a professional pilot because at the time there were probably ten newly qualified commercial and airline transport pilots competing for every available job opening, and operators had their pick of the best. In the maintenance field, however, it was the opposite story; at the flight school there was only one mechanic, recently licensed, and not very confident at all in his abilities. As an experienced, but not yet licensed mechanic, I assisted him in getting the flight school’s grounded aircraft operational again. For all intent and purpose, I have never been without work since.
I do not think it is inappropriate that I should be the person to write this report. What is required here is a broad-based, general knowledge of aviation, aircraft, their operations. I do not think an investigator has to have a DC-6 type rating to know how they are operated; provided one consults pilots with the rating to confirm what published documents like airplane flight manuals and Approved Type Certificate (A.T.C.) specifications say. Here in Alaska, it is very possible that we currently have the largest base of DC-6 experience operating, on a daily basis, in the world. I have known a great many DC-6 type rated pilots in my lifetime, to say nothing of having been related to one by marriage.
Any reader who wants to challenge what I state in this document is urged to consult with their own “expert(s)”. I do not claim to be an expert on any aspect of this; however every DC-6 expert that I consulted throughout this process confirmed readily what I thought to be the case when I presented them with the evidence. So that is why I think that it is time to reexamine what actually happened during the crash, as opposed to what most of the world thinks happened. Because, the two are very different.
It is not within my area of expertise to speculate on the “why” of what caused the precipitating action of this accident. I have read a number of reports and books over recent years that attempt to tackle that subject, but I have nothing to contribute to what other researchers, with apparent objective credibility, have amassed.
I am, however, bothered enough by the acceptance of the original Rhodesian premises by the world at large and former U.N. officials, and the effect these misconceptions have had on the descendants, relatives, and friends of the victims, crew and passengers, that I am submitting this document to whom it may concern.
PREMISES The Annex II report sets a number of premises that have gone unquestioned. They are, and I will attempt to order them in terms of occurring chronology, as follows:
That the aircraft crashed during the course of making a “normal instrument approach”.
That the aircraft was not on fire prior to its collision with the anthill on the ground.
That the crew could be faulted for not having transmitted a declaration of emergency during the approach.
That the crew could be faulted for the wreckage being found with the landing lights in the off position.
That the captain could be faulted for not having broadcast all of his intentions to the destination airport, especially in an area known to be hostile to U.N. personnel. These points, in addition to others, are where I will begin.
THE INSTRUMENT APPROACH Annex II, part 3, par. 12.6 “. . .hit trees and the ground at a shallow angle of 5 degrees or less, at what appears to have been normal approach speed, at an altitude of 4357 feet MER (?) with its undercarriage locked down, flaps partially extended, and with all four engines developing power and all the propellers in the normal pitch range, heading towards the Ndola radio beacon on a landing approach.”
There are four main parts of this statement to be addressed. They are to be considered in light of the aircrafts position in relation to the Ndola airport, which according to Annex II Part 1 par. 1 item 1.1 was “From Ndola aerodrome control tower 8.05 nautical miles on a true bearing 279 degrees.” 8.05 nautical miles is over 9.25 statute miles, from the airport at which it was intending to land.
01. “Normal approach speed” in my experience is based upon the aircraft’s stall speed, landing speed, and minimum control speed in multi-engine aircraft. It varies with combinations of all of the above and is normally calculated in percentages above the stall speed, which itself varies with differing weights, centers of gravity, bank angle, flap/high-lift device deployment, etc. In standard airport traffic area there is also a speed limit of 156 knots (180 mph.) Since the beginning of the age of the jumbo jets and the airports from which they operate, the speed restrictions have been raised because many of that class of aircraft have higher stall speeds than 156 knots (180 mph.), so for them, there is only the 250 knots (288 mph.) below 10,000 feet rule, which I believe applies to all airspace complying with ICAO rules.
Normal approach speed, at that stage of the approach, should have been 160 knots (184 mph.) or even more in this case, with this captain concerned about the possibility of armed, hostile aircraft in the general area. In consultation with a DC-6 captain, he said except in very unusual circumstances the standard instrument approach speed up to the final approach fix, which in this case was the Ndola NDB, 2.5 nautical miles, 2.875 statute miles from the runway end, would be 160 knots (184 mph.) Maximum flap extension speed is 139 knots (160 mph.)
The point that needs to be made here, and clearly with no ambiguity, is that there would have been no reason whatsoever in a normal instrument approach, especially in good weather conditions, to have had the aircraft slowed down to landing configuration while over 9 miles away from the airport. Standard procedure would be to begin deploying landing flaps and landing gear upon reaching the final approach fix, which in this case was the Ndola NDB (non directional beacon), approx. 3 miles from the runway, which is a fairly average distance for an NDB or a VOR (very high frequency omni-directional range) to be situated to a runway. That the aircraft was found configured for landing at the farthest point it was going to reach away from the airport during its instrument approach, means that the pilot would have had to slow-fly it throughout all of the rest of the approach procedure to a landing at the airport. There is absolutely nothing normal about that. This was the very first thing that struck me when I initially read the report. It is indicative, however, OF A LANDING ATTEMPT AT THE LOCATION WHERE IT CAME TO REST.
02. “. . .with its undercarriage locked down, flaps partially extended, . . .” The DC-6 series aircraft have a stall speed of approximately 80 knots (92 mph.), and consequently a lower approach speed than the jet airliners that replaced them beginning in the 1960’s. The closest replacement is the Boeing 737 series, which like the DC-6 have an approximately 30,000 lb. payload and were generally intended to operate from the same runways that the DC-series used. While the Boeing will neither take off or land and stop in as short a distance as a DC-6 due to its higher stall and approach speeds, the differences are not gigantic. For this project I consulted a Boeing 737 captain whose career spanned the 737-200 series thru the 900 series, and was told, again, that landing gear and landing flap settings were deployed upon reaching the final approach fix, which is generally approximately 3 miles from the end of the runway. This, in an aircraft with higher approach and landing speeds.
Wing flaps increase both lift and drag, and were originally developed to enable an aircraft to make steeper approaches to land without increasing speed that would need to be bled off during rollout after touchdown, in other words to shorten the landing to a stop distance. That they would also reduce the takeoff distance and improve the climb performance was a secondary consideration. Annex II part 10 par. 10.3.4.2 states that all indications were that the flaps were in the 30 degree position. I would estimate that this is approximately optimal for lift and slow flight which would be desirable for the lowest approach and landing speed based upon experience with numerous different types of aircraft; I have flown a number of different airplanes with flap deployment angles beyond 35 degrees and noticed that at angles much beyond 35 resulted in much higher drag components than lift components and engineering books generally support that observation based on wind tunnel testing. The higher angles of extension were generally useful only for bleeding off excess altitude quickly in situations where a pilot wanted to get a lot closer to the ground in a hurry. To my experience, 30 degrees was optimal landing flap in many, but not all, types. Again, it is indicative OF A LANDING ATTEMPT AT THE LOCATION WHERE IT CAME TO REST.
03. “. . .with all 4 engines developing power . . .” 10.1.4 states “. . . the four engines were broken from their mountings and severely damaged by impact and subsequent fire . . . .” Examination of photographs in the appendix reveals that engines #1, 2, and 3 had fallen to the ground after the aluminum nacelle structures melted away in the fire subsequent to coming to rest, and the straight steel tube struts of the actual engine mounts are still straight and attached to the engines. Furthermore, the above mentioned engines are all still in the approximate positions they would have occupied on the wing with only the #4 engine having detached in the crash sequence, and it is laying in probably very close proximity to where it was wrenched from the wing during the cartwheel arc.
The second thing that struck me upon first viewing the wreckage plan is that almost the entire aircraft is still in one place.10.2.1 “The main wreckage was contained in an area approximately 60 feet by 90 feet . . . .”
The DC-6 is almost exactly 100 feet long with a 117’6” wingspan, which means after it came to rest and cooled down the whole of the main wreckage would fit within the same rectangle as its original size. The wreckage plan, as surveyed, indicates that the vast majority of its original parts ended up oriented in the approximate positions that they occupied prior to the crash. In other words, throughout the crash sequence, very little of the aircraft was displaced from itself until very close to the end of its movement. This indicates a low energy crash with a very slow speed impact, at least relative to even minimum flying speed, to say nothing of a 160 knot instrument approach speed. 160 knots (184 statute mph.) is a velocity of almost exactly 270 feet per second. The wreckage plan length of 760 ft. from first point of treetop contact to ground strike of the fuselage nose (10.1.1) is approximately one half of what I have observed to occur in unintentional controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) crashes during my time in this business. It is, however, in addition to viewing the appendix photographs of the site that were taken from the ground and from the air, completely consistent with the path of an aircraft with an 80 knot stall speed being intentionally landed.
Aircraft that are only capable of even 120 knots in unintentional CFIT crashes generally never resemble an airplane by the time all of the parts come to a stop, their propellers are almost never still attached to the engines, their landing gear are almost never anywhere near where they were originally attached, and their tail groups when broken off have usually broken the control cables in overload displaying a “broomstraw” effect. In this case, when the tailcone broke off in the cartwheel there wasn’t enough energy left to pull the cables apart. If I had to estimate the minimum speed required to disintegrate the nose section of the fuselage such as is displayed in the wreckage plan and what can be seen of the remains in the photographs, I would say that it would require at most only about 50 to 60 knots to do that kind of damage. It was explained to me in 1986 by a good friend that was a DC-6 captain at that time, that the 4-engine DC-series had a somewhat fragile nose landing gear structure but not unusually so compared to other makes in it’s class; but when they tore out of the fuselage it often did a lot of other damage and could possibly make the incident beyond economic repair. I saw an example of that just last fall (2020) where a DC-4 had its nose landing gear torn out in a ditch at barely more than walking speed; the damage extended through both sides of the factory break joint where the nose (flight deck, cockpit) section attaches to the forward fuselage section and the operator decided that it was beyond economical repair, according to a conversation with his director of maintenance. This should reflect no discredit on the part of the designers; from personal experience repairing nose landing gear damage on many different types of nosewheel type airplanes it is generally a fragile part of all of them.
04. “. . .and all the propellers in the normal pitch range, . . .” This statement stretches ambiguity beyond limits. The Hamilton Standard 43E60/6895A-8 propellers such as were installed on SE-BDY (of which I have owned several sets and still possess a crate full of hub and dome parts) has a normal pitch range of approximately 90 degrees from neutral for feathering and forward thrust and maybe 20 degrees aft of neutral for reverse thrust. 10.3.4.4 states: “Inspection of the propeller stop ring assemblies confirmed that the angular setting of all propellers was in the constant speed range.”
First, the stop rings do not determine the constant speed range; they are only the outer limits of the blade travel, at full feather and full reverse. The constant speed range is a function of the engine driven governor and the distributor valve assembly housed within the hub and dome and is sensed with electrical switches attached to the blades and actuated with an electric motor driven oil pump mounted on the engine reduction gear nose case immediately behind the propeller hub, with a rubber/spring lip seal interfacing the parting surfaces. The only way to determine the angular setting of the blades in this installation is to measure with a propeller protractor against the rotational axis.
Second, the constant speed range is also a function of the engine turning at a high enough RPM for the governor to supply enough boosted oil pressure to operate the distributor valve to keep the blades off of the low pitch stop, which in reversing propellers such as these is again a function of the distributor valve. But for the purposes of this analysis, that is not important.
Third, the photographic evidence, is what is important. The U.N. report appendix contains photographs with 16-digit letter/number codes, of which I saved fifteen to a file, beginning with S-0727-0004-01-00002, and following will be referencing the last two digits. I will reference the individual blades in clock face numbers, as viewed from the rear of the engine looking forward as is standard practice.
It is difficult to differentiate between engine#1 and engine#4 because there were fewer views of #4, but both could be identified by orientation with the wreckage plan. It is readily apparent that both of these had almost identical damage to their blades, except that the third blade on #4 is not visible. Photo 07 shows #4 with the 10 o’clock blade in standard reverse thrust position. The 2 o’clock blade has had its spring pack drives sheared in overload during the ground strike and has rotated on its pivot axis into an approximate reverse feather position, with its trailing edge forward instead of its leading edge when in standard feather mode. This indicates that its leading edge struck the ground hard enough to shear the spring packs while the leading edge of the blade was rotated aft of its plane of rotation, in other words while at a reverse thrust angle. With 2 of the 3 blades coming to rest in a reverse thrust angle, I think it’s safe to assume that the propeller was fully operating in the reverse thrust mode at time of impact.
The #1 engine is well represented in the photographs, with all blades visible. Photo 16 shows the 10 o’clock blade in standard reverse thrust position, spring packs intact. The 2 o’clock blade is in reverse feather position, spring packs sheared as per the same blade on the #4 engine, and the 6 o’clock blade is also in standard reverse thrust position, spring packs intact, but has bent aft throughout its length progressively to the tip which is common when rotation is coming to a stop while the engine and airframe behind it are still moving forward. That the propellers on engines #1 and #4 are far less damaged than the ones on #2 and #3 is partially due to the fact that they were mounted higher on the wings due to wing dihedral, and didn’t penetrate the ground as deeply when they struck.
Photo 07 shows #2 engine with its 2 o’clock blade rotated into a reverse feather position also, spring packs sheared. The broken off shank of what would be the 10 o’clock blade is in standard feather position, spring packs intact. What would be the 6 o’clock blade is not visible in this view, and I haven’t found any other photos showing it, but based on its proximity to the ground I think it’s reasonable to assume that it also was sheared off during its ground strike.
Photo 33 shows #3 engine, which reveals its 2 o’clock blade broken off at what I would estimate at most to be its 25” station, which is measured from the propeller shaft centerline. It is clearly in a standard reverse thrust position, spring packs intact. The 10 o’clock blade is broken off 1.5” to 2” outboard of the hub clamp halves, so close to its round shank section that its angular position is inconclusive. The 6 o’clock blade has broken off inside of the hub clamp halves through the blade bushing bore; it obviously fragmented into a number of pieces. As with all three of the other engine’s propellers, I think it is reasonable to assume that the #3 propeller was fully in the reverse thrust mode when the blades struck the ground. I would deduce from the condition of the #3 propeller that it was positioned to penetrate the ground the deepest and most solidly of the four. The #3 engine also received by far the most fire damage after coming to rest most likely due to its proximity to the most remaining fuel in the right hand wing. I will discuss this in more detail later.
I have thought long and hard about how to estimate how much power the engines were developing at the moment the propellers struck the ground, and it is a difficult question. The propeller blades were group 4, an early post-war development and were the strongest of all the Hamiltons ever built for piston engines, generally used only on the latest and most powerful post-war radial engines. I am not aware of any empirical strike strength tests, which is not to say that Hamilton Standard didn’t conduct any, I just haven’t heard about them. If I had to guess I would estimate that it would require a high-cruise manifold pressure setting to shear them off and break them through the blade bore bushing hole as is evident in the photos. The captain clearly had gotten the throttles well forward and was making a lot of reverse thrust before the nose landing gear collapsed and the nose and propellers hit the ground.
THE WRECKAGE PLAN The Annex II wreckage plan and the photographs of the descent path appear to show a deliberate, controlled descent with directional control maintained all the way to the anthill, as though it was intentional, and I am suggesting that it was.
I had difficulty scaling the exact measurements of where the small parts that were torn from the aircraft came to rest relative to the initial tree contact, and varying figures are given for the height of the anthill from 9 to 12 feet, which I would have thought would be consistent with the whole site having been charted by professional surveyors, but in reality this is not important.
What is important is to realize that only 760 feet from initial treetop contact the aircraft was rolling with all three landing gear on the ground, right side up, travelling in a straight line, directionally under control.
At some point not far from the anthill the left wing bottom skins were breached, presumably by a tree trunk, the top of which would have been broken off by the wing leading edge and spar(s), opening up one or more fuel bays and dumping their contacts to the ground in a concentrated area, which fueled the incinerated area shown at that location in the wreckage plan. As stated earlier, this would contribute to the reason that the #1 and #2 engines on the left side of the aircraft were less heavily fire damaged post-crash than the engines on the right side. However, the overall strength of the main wing box structure remained sufficiently adequate to retain its basic shape to provide the arm about which the entire aircraft would pivot upon striking close to the base of the anthill, leading edge down, and not be sheared off at that point. Obviously, the wing leading edge outboard of the engines is what actually contacted the anthill, and initiated the cartwheel, as both of the left hand engines stayed with the wing and came to rest close to their original positions on the wing.
At some point close to the anthill, (and somebody could probably do a better job of quantifying the actual measurement from the wreckage plan), but it is not marked as such, the nose landing gear structure was overloaded in the undisturbed forest terrain and collapsed. Which is to say that the oleo strut and its retraction/extension linkage was torn from its mounting structure and its broken pieces were spread along the ground from forward movement of the rest of the aircraft behind it. I looked long and hard in the wreckage plan to find the exact point where the nose gear departed, but could only find reference to a “steel shaft” alongside the base of the anthill, and couldn’t find it in the photos. Presumably, the “steel shaft” was the nose strut piston tube, which is a steel tube approximately 5” in diameter, and it was about where I would have expected it to be in this case. Other associated parts of the nose gear system were a little farther along the path, again where I would have expected them to be. I could find no reference to where the nosewheel and tire came to rest, which is important from the standpoint of knowing how long it was on the ground before failing, which was in some measure the fate sealer for the crew and passengers. I did find reference to an unidentified portion of wheel rim on the right hand side of the path and well before the anthill, but whether it was from the nosewheel or one of the dual main wheels may never be known. Photo 19 shows one of the main landing gear assemblies with the remains of both tires and wheels in place and another photo shows the same for the other MLG, so it is certain that all of the main wheel tires stayed in place throughout. While on the subject of the main landing gear, the DC-6 MLG units retract forward into their nacelle bays, and their retraction/extension links for normal operation on the ground loads the links in tension, which for metallic structures allows them to be at their strongest, especially in terms of retaining their shape when loaded. The photos show that the links had failed in compression and had bent, which would be expected to happen upon the main wheels striking the ground while traveling backwards during the cartwheel, and partially retracting back into their nacelle bays. But, effectively, they stayed in place throughout the crash, again indicative of a relatively low speed occurrence.
As stated above, shortly after landing with all three landing gear on the ground, close to the anthill, at probably the worst possible location and time, with all four engines evenly at fairly high power settings in reverse thrust in what would have been a desperate attempt to slow the momentum of the aircraft and get it stopped, (but what is in reality standard operating procedure), the nose landing gear collapsed, instantly dropping the nose section of the belly and fuselage to the ground, pivoting on the main wheel axles. When this happened, the propeller blades began contacting the ground, bending and breaking them off, and the wing leading edge from end to end rotated downwards, drastically lowering in height. As the fuselage nose belly skins, stringers, formers etc. began crushing and tearing away it allowed the wing leading edge to get even closer to the ground, until the left side contacted the anthill nearer the base than the top, which initiated the cartwheel. Had the nose gear remain in place, there is at least a chance that a relatively level wing might have been able to ride up and over it and the aircraft’s momentum to remain linear, and with even a few more seconds of reverse thrust as braking action, the survival odds would have increased dramatically.. The noted fragment of wheel rim found along the glide path, if from the single nosewheel, and if large enough to have allowed the tire to depart from the wheel, I think in this terrain would have guaranteed the failure of the nose gear assembly.
I think a further word here about center of gravity is appropriate. SE-BDY as it departed Leopoldville was handicapped with a forward C.G. (center of gravity), with little or no aft cabin load. The DC-6, as with all large airliners, was designed to carry its nominal 15-ton payload distributed throughout the cabin from end to end and as with most aircraft have the load approximately centered on the wing, since that is what is supporting everything. In this case, with the passengers and their gear in the forward part of the cabin, the C.G. would have been well toward its forward limit, known as nose heavy. This means that the pilot, under any circumstance, would have a harder time holding the nose off the ground with the elevators than if there was weight in the fuselage behind the main wheels assisting him with the balance.
I have flown airplanes with only the pilots in the front seats and nothing in the aft cabin where the nosewheel could not be held off the runway whatsoever upon landing. With power at idle, when the main wheels touched the nosewheel slammed to the runway instantly because the C.G. was well forward of the mains. At least three different DC-6 pilots I have known over the years have told me that they much preferred flying them with a somewhat aft C.G. because of the better balance. In this case however, I think it could be listed as a contributing factor to the deadliness because after getting the main wheels to the ground, with the propellers in reverse and no accelerated air flow over the elevators, the captain was unlikely to have been able to keep the nosewheel from slamming to the ground immediately and beginning the sequence of breakup of the forward fuselage structure.
ABOUT THOSE ALTIMETERS . . . There are numerous references throughout the reports about the barometric altimeters, three each, forming one of the major premises upon which the reports conclusions are based. So many, in fact, that I am not going to bother referencing them here. The Board (Annex II) and the Commission (Annex III) both spared no expense to prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the their Air Traffic Control (ATC) had properly informed the crew of the altimeter setting and that Transair had properly maintained their instruments and aircraft, as well, and that there should be no discredit reflected upon the servants of and the country hosting the visitors. If those visiting aircrews could not pay attention to their altimeters and keep from flying into the ground while executing an otherwise exemplary instrument approach it was not the host’s fault.. There is one very major problem with this.
There were four altimeters installed in this aircraft. The fourth altimeter was an “AVQ-10 Receiver Transmitter (Radar) “, per Annex II Par. 6.2 Page 15, line 3. That, and a reference on the “Enlarged Portion of Wreckage Plan” to a “Radio Altimeter” on the extreme left hand side of the page are the only times throughout all of the original reports that its existence was ever mentioned. And it was decisively important.
Mankind had long awaited a means to know exactly how far the ground was below you and how far away an obstacle was in front of you while making instrument approaches. Barometric pressure gauge instruments were reliable but didn’t give you all the information you really wanted and needed for making truly blind instrument approaches. With the WWII British development of the cavity magnetron, which made radar small enough to be carried aboard aircraft, it was a short step away to build an accurate radar altimeter. The DC-6 was among the very first of the postwar civil aircraft to be fitted with them. By then, airlines couldn’t afford not to have them. And all of the pilots that I have ever known use them when they have them during instrument approaches especially when near the ground. They tell me that they are a very reassuring and confidence-building device.
It is inconceivable that captain Hallonquist was not using the radar altimeter, if he needed an altimeter at all, throughout the portion of the instrument approach that the aircraft completed. Barometric altimeters are fine for flight where there are large safe heights above ground level and sufficiently accurate for keeping airplanes at known levels relative to each other but when you start getting close to the ground in conditions of poor or no visibility the radar altimeter is what is going to tell you where the ground or a solid object is in front of you.
I mentioned above about needing an altimeter at all. In the USA, in order to qualify for a private pilot certificate, a student must accomplish a certain number of landings and fly a certain number of hours at night during official after-sunset periods, (night time). This must be accomplished visually, under official VFR (visual flight rules) conditions. I am fairly certain that the rules to qualify for airman certificates in Sweden or the UK would be pretty similar, and in fact for all ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) countries. Without access to his logbooks, it’s a foregone conclusion to assume that with over 7800 flight hours captain Hallonquist was competent and comfortable with night VFR landings. On the night in question, the weather 38 minutes before the crash, per Annex II chap. 5 par.5.3 page 14, the visibility was 5 to 10 miles with slight smoke haze, with ceiling not given, but presumably nil cloud cover from the last prior routine weather observation, 3-1/2 hours before. So there is no reason to assume that the crew couldn’t see where the ground was.
Prior to the advent of aircraft with auto-land capability, which was probably not until at least the mid-1970’s and to my knowledge didn’t come into service until the early 1980’s, all, at least all civilian airplane landings were made visually by the human pilot. Even instrument landings were made visually, even when the approaches were made coupled to an autopilot. If at some minimum height above the ground at some certain distance from the end of the runway, and these numbers varied with different airports and with differently equipped aircraft, the pilot could not see the end of the runway to land the approach was called missed, power was applied and the aircraft climbed away to either try the approach again or proceed to an alternate airport where the weather was hopefully better. But all landings required the pilot, at some point, to see the runway visually. And the pilot was only using the altimeter to know where to not descend below. To this day, the vast majority of airplane landings worldwide are still done this way.
Upon reaching Ndola, the aircraft established communications with the tower informing them that they had the airport in sight. At that point the captain could have made a VFR landing within the airport traffic area (ATA) without following the instrument approach procedure. Transair company policy was that if the crew was unfamiliar with an airport, and captain Hallonquist had never been to Ndola before, an instrument approach was to be made. The captain could have ignored this but he was obviously the type of person that would rather follow the rules and go by the book than ever have to explain in the future why he did not. I fully understand this philosophy, it is how I’ve tried to live my own life. It can be well imagined that for an instant it crossed his mind that he could just set up and land while he was right there, but he knew that an instrument approach was just a few minutes more, no big deal, we can see the ground, no appreciable weather. In other words, he didn’t really need an altimeter to tell him where the ground was. He could see the ground. And the radar altimeter told him exactly how high above the ground he was.
THE PRECIPITATING EVENT To my observation, in the study of aircraft accidents throughout the course of my life, there is almost always a precipitating event that sets off a chain of actions, reactions, counteractions, etc. that results in the crashed aircraft somewhere on the surface of earth. In this case, it is known from Annex II that the captain communicated to Ndola tower that all was well and within minutes the aircraft was being incinerated with its own wing fuel and that fifteen of the sixteen occupants lives had ended, and that the last would succumb in less than a week. That person, Sgt. Harold Julien, was the only eyewitness to the crash.
To my experience, eyewitness testimony is considered evidence in a court of law, at least in this country. I am unfamiliar with Rhodesian law in the 1960’s, but in the USA in the 1960’s Sgt. Julien’s statements would have been considered evidence in a crash investigation. Since there is no other actual evidence to the contrary, and testimony of ground observers about the airport over-flight and entry to the instrument approach procedure are insufficiently conclusive to determine externally what the precipitating event was, it seems logical to me that Sgt. Julien’s statements, as brief as they are, are the only thing that can be considered as evidence in a search for the cause of the chain of events leading to the crash.
In the UN Commission report, par. 129., Senior Inspector Allen testified to the U.N. Commission that he spoke with Sgt. Julien and asked him three questions; 1. “What happened? He said: ‘It blew up’.” 2. “Was this over the runway? And he said ‘Yes’. “ 3. “What happened then? And he replied: ‘There was great speed—great speed’.” “It blew up—” “—over the runway.”
I have read all three of these reports several times and still don’t understand the reluctance of the investigators, including the U.N. and the Swedish observers, to not make those six words the central point, the number one item on the list of where to begin to find the truth about what happened. Especially from the standpoint of determining whether or not there is fault to be assigned to the flight crew.
Assuming Sgt. Julien was belted into any seat in the forward cabin, looking out the side window on whichever side he was sitting on, he may or may not have had a view of the lighted runway and the town of Ndola but it is likely that the captain would have informed the passengers that they had arrived overhead Ndola and would be setting up to land there. It would have been the last thing he could identify location-wise and anywhere in that vicinity for him would be “over the runway”. I don’t know if Inspector Allen was deliberately trying to trip him up or why he asked him if it was over the runway when he knew that the aircraft had overflown the runway and not blown up there, but, it seems to me, it was an unusual question to ask a person in Sgt. Julien’s condition. What I am getting at here is that Sgt. Julien knew where the runway was and that the aircraft had blown up. They sound like lucid answers to me, and not as though he was thinking about horses or submarines, for example.
In my view, in light of all of the data and evidence of all of the pages of all of the reports and the information displayed in all of the images of all of the photographs in the U.N. file, the only thing I can see that qualifies as a precipitating event is Sgt. Julien’s: “It blew up”. And he was the only one left that was there when it happened.
Airplanes have been blowing up for a long time, in fact for almost as long as they’ve been in existence. There is a lot of video of it happening; I can think of footage that I’ve seen going back to the 1920’s. And I’ve been on-scene to ones within seconds to minutes after the explosion. I’ve salvaged wrecks after the fact, and studied the effects of explosions on structures and materials.
To my experience and observation, on metallic structures, if some event ignites the fuel vapors, it is the vapors that explode and the still-liquid fuel then burns, but the explosive event is by then over. During the explosion some weak area in or near a seam will give way and tear open, leaving, in effect, a chimney from which the burning fuel would exhaust. In aluminum stressed-skin wet wing or bladder tank explosions, there is usually a torn section of skin along a rib or a stringer or even a spar, (weakened because of the drilled holes for rivets) that has opened up and from which the the fire burned upward out. I have never seen an example where the fire burned downward; only upward. Presumably, because heat rises.
In viewing video of air combat, of which many hours exist of footage of most of the combatant countries back to at least WWII, when an airplane being shot at catches fire and smoke begins trailing behind, it is subtle but noticeable that the flames are still burning upward and the smoke is trailing slightly upward.
Another thing that struck me when I was standing near a burning airplane at night, while the fire department was trying to extinguish it with water, which was rather ineffective, was how brightly a gasoline fire lit up the sky in the dark.
As stated earlier, aircraft fuel tanks have been blowing up resulting in the destruction of the aircraft for a long time, for a number of reasons. The incendiary (tracer) bullet was developed during WWI to ignite the hydrogen gas in enemy airships and observation balloons, and was very effective, not only for that purpose but also to ignite the fuel in airplane fuel tanks. As TWA 800 proved in 1996, chafing electrical wiring after arcing long enough could blow a hole through an aluminum alloy sheet and ignite fuel vapors that would explode the tank so violently that it initiated an inflight breakup. About two weeks after that, right here in Alaska an engine failure on a DC-6 led to a chain of events that resulted in ignition of one of the wing fuel tanks which was left to burn long enough to result in the wing folding up and an inflight breakup. Electrostatic discharge (ESD)(static electricity) igniting empty or only partially full fuel tanks was known to have damaged or destroyed (I am going by memory here) about 25 civilian turbojet airliners and comparable heavy military aircraft (bombers, tankers, transports) combined since the introduction of the jet age. For that reason, after an airliner lands at an airport and taxis to its gate and shuts down, along with chocking the wheels a ground cable is attached to a fitting in the structure to remove the static charge it has built up while flying through the air. An airline line mechanic colleague tells me that he has measured as much as 50 volts upon making that connection.
But ESD is unlikely to have been the cause of the explosion that SE-BDY experienced. However, the explosion that Sgt. Julien described is most likely to have been the precipitating event that caused captain Hallonquist to make the decision to get the airplane on the ground, now, immediately if not sooner.
FORCED LANDINGS Forced landings have happened throughout history for nearly countless reasons, but several of the reasons account for the vast majority of the occurrences. Topping the list would be engine failure; if your engine fails you have no choice but to put it down wherever you happen to be. That would be in the involuntary forced landing category. In the voluntary forced landing category, and some statistical database could prove me wrong, but to my experience inflight fire would be at the top. I have before me a list of seven airplanes that I had some thread of connection to in some form or other that were force landed by their pilots into whatever terrain was below them at that moment because it was the only chance they had to stay alive. One of the seven, the aforementioned DC-6, technically doesn’t qualify as an attempted forced landing, because of the captain’s indecision, but all of them resulted in aircraft that never flew again, and in five of the seven all survived, but with some minor injuries. In the other two, there were no survivors. The incidents I am referring to here all occurred in Alaska since 1977, and it is likely that there have been others that never came to my attention. All seven of them were due to inflight fires. One of the seven was a new customer of mine, but the aircraft was one I had never and was destined to never work on.
After almost five months of examining these three reports, the conclusion I would draw is that the case of SE-BDY fits into the category of a voluntary attempted forced landing due to an inflight explosion and fire that was successful until its final seconds, and then an unseen and un-seeable solid object ended its chance for a successful termination.
THE LAST ACTIONS I will attempt to re-create the final minutes of the flight of SE-BDY based on the information in the reports, as I would visualize it to have to have occurred. I want to remind the reader that the largest airplane that I have ever steered through the sky was a DC-3, which is for all practical purposes not all that different from a DC-6. The ancillary control systems in the DC-6 were substantially different in being mostly electrical relay controlled, it had two more engines, and there were more systems in general such as anti-detonant injection (water/methanol) for the engines, reversing propellers, BMEP gauges for fine-tuning engine power and fuel mixture, etc.; it is a considerably more complex machine. But for the purposes of understanding what actions were taken and their results, it would have been basically as follows:
01. The aircraft has descended from the east toward Ndola from its reported maximum cruise altitude of 16,000 ft. and establishes communications with the control tower. It has just flown a long trip, far out of its way to avoid aircraft hostile to U.N. personnel and has avoided radio transmissions as much as possible to avoid detection. The captain states his intentions to enter the NDB instrument approach and is told to report reaching 6000 ft. There are no further communications with the tower.
02. It is likely that at last communication with the tower that the aircraft was already at 6000 ft., based on airport personnel statements and the extreme likelihood that the captain already had the Ndola approach plate in front of him, and had based his descent rate into Ndola to arrive near the minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the area.
03. The aircraft turns onto the outbound course leg and airspeed adjusted to at least 160 knots indicated airspeed. The Ndola approach plate in the U.N. report appendix gave times for approaches at 180 and 200 knots in addition; there is no way to ever know what speed was actually used. My best guess is that it would have been 160 knots.
04. At some point approximately but probably more than half way on the outbound leg course the precipitating event occurs. There is a bang, a flash of light, and then a constant partial illumination of the night sky on the left side of the aircraft.
05. The captain looks out the left cabin window and sees a section of the upper wing skin torn open upwards, with bright yellow flames billowing rearward behind that area. It is possible that he can feel some diminished lift component from the spoiler-effect of the damaged wing skin on that side, and may have moved the aileron trim to compensate.
06. Seeing this, the captain realizes quickly that they cannot expect the wing to last long enough for them to make it the three or more minutes it would take to get back to the Ndola runway; that they probably have only some number of seconds to live. He determines that he is going to land the airplane onto the ground in front of him, whatever that looks like, before the airplane breaks up. He is not going to waste the time it takes to inform Ndola tower of the situation; flight crews generally never do. Investigators wish they would.
07. With his right hand he reaches up and pulls the throttles back; with his left he holds some back pressure on the elevators and with his right hand then starts trimming the elevators nose up. Airspeed begins to decrease, heading toward flap extension speed.
08. The captain has already told the first officer and flight engineer his intentions; they are assisting him in the other physical actions necessary to configure the aircraft for slow flight and landing. It’s possible that the first officer is also assisting him in holding pressure on the ailerons to keep the wings level.
09. The aircraft is slowing down into flap extension range, beginning to descend, the captain is trimming the nose up on and off, waiting to get down to landing gear extension speed, for a large drag component to bleed off the excess altitude. The captain is nominally staying on the turn-back arc of the instrument approach.
10. The aircraft has slowed enough for landing flap angle, then landing gear speed is reached and the captain calls for gear down.
11. With the aircraft slowed well down, in an effort to speed the descent and get rid of the excess altitude, the captain pushes the nose down with the elevators. The wind noise increases, and with the nose down attitude the occupants get a sense of “great speed”, but in reality the DC-6’s landing profile is comparatively steeply nose down in normal conditions, opposite that of jet airliners, that land steeply nose up. The large double-slotted wing flaps, and modest wing loading allow for impressively steep descents at comparatively low airspeeds.
12. Seeing and sensing the proximity to the treetops, the captain begins putting back pressure on the control column, judging the round-out with the experience of 1445 hours in DC-6’s, and rolls out of the procedure turn onto the return course to the NDB. He is possibly helped in his depth perception sight picture by some of the small campfires that the local charcoal makers have burning sprinkled around the general area. He probably doesn’t need landing lights; they are useful for illuminating reflective objects and lighter colored areas/objects, but can be only distracting if there is nothing light to reflect.
13. Having leveled off just above the treetops, the captain retards the throttles to idle and holds back pressure on the elevators and adds more nose up trim to relieve the pressure, bleeding off more speed toward the stall. It is possible that the thought occurs to him for a few thousandths of a second that if he makes it through this, in the future he will insist on having some ballast in the tail on these otherwise fairly empty charter trips. Now would be a good time to be a bit tail-heavy.
14. The aircraft is gently settling, the treetops are beginning to brush the belly, the propellers are chopping off twigs, there are probably some unfamiliar sounds resulting from this.
15. The ever-increasingly sized tree branches are clattering off the sides of the fuselage from the propellers now, the sounds of tree trunks snapping off beneath the belly and wings can be heard clearly. A somewhat larger tree trunk contacts the left wing leading edge a little inboard of the tip rib and shears through the light skin, stringers, etc. and the wing tip falls away to the ground. That left wing just can’t be held up quite level, but the aircraft is still traveling straight, into a little darker darkness.
16. The captain throws the propeller switches into the reverse thrust position as a group with his right hand and when the propellers start translating he reaches for the throttles and begins advancing them forward.
17. The aircraft is halfway or more to the ground and the trees are breaking off lower and lower. The manifold pressures are coming well up and the engines are roaring, the propellers are chopping off ever-increasing sizes of limbs and trunks. The reverse thrust in addition to the arresting effect of the bending and breaking trees are having an effect; the aircraft is well below stall speed now. Landing gear doors are being battered and tearing off, as well as pieces of wing skin, wing flap skin, and possibly horizontal stabilizer leading edge skin.
18. The aircraft has made it to the ground; all three landing gear are on the forest floor. The burning left wing has not had enough time to shed molten sections of skin yet, due to the occurrence at pattern height and the captain’s immediate decision to get the airplane on the ground.
19. The left wing pushes over a larger tree, probably just outboard of the main wheels that doesn’t surrender easily and tears a sizeable hole through the bottom wing skins, instantly dumping a significant quantity of already burning fuel onto the ground.
20. Some or all of the flight deck crew could possibly, for some very small fraction of a second, think that this might turn out OK. They are on the ground, upright, still largely in one piece, all still strapped into their seats, uninjured.
21. The aircraft at this time is effectively a 38-ton bulldozer, mowing down trees on a forest floor that has probably been undisturbed for centuries, if not millennia; I don’t know the history of that area. Except that it’s not built like a bulldozer, and I doubt that one has ever been built that would move at whatever speed it was going at this moment on its own. The nose landing gear at this time cannot withstand the combination of ground roughness, imposed weight, speed, possibly flat or even missing tire, and/or other unknown factors, and collapses, tearing out and further weakening the surrounding structure. The forward fuselage and nose section have pushed the nose gear down to its collapse, and relieved of its resistance continue to plunge downward, crushing and tearing the light aluminum structure to pieces as the forward shifting center of gravity exacerbates the situation even further, as it is effectively standing what originally was a 100 ft. long fuselage on its end.
22. Immediately after this, with the nose section disintegrating, the wing leading edges rotated downward, and well powered-up engines and propellers slicing the ground, the left wing leading edge contacts near the base of the anthill, and the 38 ton mass with still considerable momentum rotates around it, side-loading the second fuselage section that attaches presumably to the front spar section of the wing, ultimately severing it.
I don’t think I need to go any farther with this; I assume the reader knows the rest of the story.
For the aircraft to have been found as described and photographed in the reports, it would have had to happen generally as I have described. A type-rated DC-6 captain could certainly provide more and better detail of the specifics of operations and actions, and a mechanic with a lot of DC-6 experience could provide more and better detail of how things worked in this case, and here in Alaska there is and has been a lot of DC-6 experience, but to my knowledge none have researched this case and come forward with their observations. I suspect that most who are currently alive are unaware of it. I don’t think I had heard of it until maybe ten years ago at the most. But, those who were aware of it at the time, even as children, have kept the account of the crash alive, and rightfully so, as it is an injustice to the memory of those whose lives were cut short.
In my view, the flight crew did everything right. I can’t see a single place where I wouldn’t have done the same thing in that situation. I can’t imagine that approach through the trees and the touchdown on the forest floor to have been accomplished more skillfully by anyone I’ve ever heard of, Eric Brown or Bob Hoover, anybody. I can only hope that I would instantly swallow my fear and act decisively in a similar situation, as this captain and crew did. They are as shining an example to all that it can be done, as others I have known and have heard of have done, as there is.
To me, it is really, and I mean really, obvious what happened there.
I have written this for the offspring, the relatives, and friends of the victims, in hopes that the dark cloud of implication that has surrounded this crew, completely unreasonably I believe, for some six decades now, can finally be lifted.
Joseph (Joe) Majerle III Anchorage, Alaska July 2021
The United Nations will be 75 years old this October 24th, and when I see how certain member nations react to having their human rights abuses pointed out to them, how they bully and attempt to silence others, interfere with elections, poison their tea, kidnap, arrest, dismember them, or shoot down their planes, it only reaffirms how important the UN truly is; how important it is that all nations be able to come together and communicate honestly with each other for peace. The UN makes a difference in so many lives every day around the world, and it made a huge difference in the lives of the Fabry family, pretty much saving Vlado’s life by giving him a legal position in 1946 and getting him out of Prague – Vlado was lucky to live to age 40.
In May of this year, I was sent an interview of Vlado’s personal secretary at Hotel Le Royal in Leopoldville(now Kinshasa), from Maurin Picard, author of “Ils Ont Tue Monsieur H”, and she says she “had worked for weeks with Vladimir Fabry and the issue of the “frightfuls”, these mercenaries.
“I made dozens of photocopies from these documents that had been somehow collected and that had to do with these mercenaries. Vladimir Fabry worked a great deal on this issue. We did an extensive research on these documents.”
She gives her recollection of 17 September 1961: “That day, when I arrived at my office, Vladimir Fabry immediately requested to dictate some telegrams. I spent the whole afternoon doing that: typing messages, then bringing them to the “chiffre” for them to be coded accordingly with the recipient’s identity.
By the time I was finished, they were getting ready to leave for the airport.
Before leaving, Vladimir Fabry was so thrilled.
Happy as a kid who was just offered a new toy.
Albeit a very reserved character, he was practically jumping on his feet.
He came into my office and said excitedly: “M******, I am leaving with the Secretary-General! I am trusting you with my car keys!”
He had to be very happy, for he would never have done such a thing otherwise. His car was an official UN vehicle. He told me I could use it all the time during his absence.”
In connection to mercenaries, here is one more document of interest I found during my visit to the UN archives in May 2015, concerning Vlado and Operation Rum Punch; when 79 mercenaries working for Katanga were arrested on 28 August 1961. From Series 0793-0012-81, with folder description “UNOC: Mercenaries, Fabry”, a letter from Conor Cruise O’Brien to Michel Tombelaine in English, with the legal advice of Vladimir Fabry in French:
From the family of UN officer Peter J. Hazou, I am proud to share their contribution of photos and memories from 1961, and a letter from the former Leopoldville, now Kinshasa, that was written on this day, 55 years ago.
Dag Hammarskjold, center, in white suit, his bodyguard William Ranallo at far left, and Peter J. Hazou at right in dark suit with lapel pin.
From reverse of UN photo: “SECRETARY-GENERAL LEAVES FOR CONFERENCE WITH CONGO PREMIER. UN 72653 -United Nations, Leopoldville, September, 1961. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold leaves UN Headquarters in Leopoldville on his way to meet Congolese Premier, Cyrille Adoula. The Secretary-General was consulting with Premier Adoula on the Katanga dispute.”
Friday, September 15, 1961
Dear Abboud and family,
We are still here in Congo and still enjoying ourselves. Peter has decided to stay a while longer as it is to our advantage financially, and so we will remain here in Congo until the end of November, 1961. At that time we are planning to take a three week cruise from Point Noir in French Congo and go up West Africa, stopping at a different port each day and ending up in Casablanca and then going to Marseille, where we will take a plane home. It will be a very interesting trip. It will get us home in cold Winter weather, though. We would stay longer but we have our house empty at home and that is a responsibility. We have registered Linda at Sacre Coeure school where they speak only French. She doesn’t know any yet but will learn quickly. In two months she won’t speak it perfectly but it will be better than nothing.
Sunday we all went on another boat ride up the Congo River. We stopped at a few islands and on one was a small African village. The children were interested in seeing how the people live. It was on the French Congo side. It is fun to go on these sandy islands. People swim from there but we don’t because the Congo River is brown and has strong currents which would pull one downstream quickly. Someone saw a crocodile once but we never did.
I take the children to the pool often because they love it. Linda swims a bit now, and Petey uses the tube. Tennis is available but I haven’t been able to get Peter to play much. He is still gaining weight but this week he intends to go on a diet. Linda has gotten very tall, and Petey is maturing nicely. I am happy that you are all well. We received your letter and it was good to get all your news. It is good Marcos is still globe-trotting, and I am glad it has been a good tourist season. I hope the weather remains pleasant for you. Over here it is still pleasantly cool, and we have rainy days now and then. The heavy rains will be coming soon and also the warm weather. Yesterday I taught our house boy to cook stuffed cabbage and Peter loved it. Also, I cook spaghetti occasionally because the family loves it. Sunday nights we sit at the outdoor gelateria and have Italian ice cream. Sometimes we go to the football matches (the Nigerians are good players) and sometimes we go to the movies, and so the time goes. There are still many cocktail parties, and the enclosed picture was taken at an Indian Officers’ one under a huge tent.
Wednesday [13 September 1961], Dag [Hammarskjold] came in and Peter was the protocol officer for the government at the airport. He greeted Adoula, Gizenga, Mobutu and Momboko[?-TB] when they arrived and then he made all the arrangements. When the S-G’s plane arrived he went up to meet him with Linner and Gen.[McKeown]. The Congolese and Nigerian bands played and it was a very nice welcome.
Tonight we will attend a big reception given by the Sec. General. This is a very crucial week here in the Congo. There is heavy fighting in Katanga, and at the huge UN army base. Last night the planes of UN personnel arrived from there as they were evacuated for safety. Don’t worry about us, though, as we are quite safe in Leopoldville as the fighting is far away. Peter is taking care of settling the refugees comfortably. If there is any big job Peter is asked to do it because they know it will get done properly. Because of this, Peter is working hard and practically running the big UN operation here but feels he doesn’t get the appreciation he deserves from headquarters, who do not realize he is working so hard because some of the other men are not capable of handling their jobs and so it falls on Peter. But it is a satisfaction to handle jobs well. He set up the whole Lovanium operation, which was tremendous and cost a million dollars. He used to have a private radio connection with it when it was locked in session, although he was one of the few people who had complete access to it. Too bad he didn’t take pictures there. We all hope the Katanga situation resolves itself quickly without civil war breaking out.
Well, Linda will start school Monday and we are glad about it. Tomorrow we will take a trip across the river to Brazzaville and look the town over. It is much smaller than Leopoldville. The past few days were warm and the hot season is starting to come in. It isn’t uncomfortable yet, though. I guess it is getting cooler in Bethlehem and the tourists are fewer. It is amazing to think that we will be having another great trip next Summer and will be with you again. I guess we can never complain about the United Nations! The children send kisses to each one of you and they are constantly drawing pictures which they say are for you. They are too bulky to send, though. Take good care of yourselves and keep in good spirits and health.
[At end of letter, Peter Hazou writes in pen:]
I am sorry I have not been able to write more often since I have not been able to find the time. Thank you for your letters which arrive here via New York much quicker than in the past. As soon as we return to New York (about 17 December 1961) I shall resume a more regular correspondence. I am tired but healthy and I am sure the boat trip from the Congo to Marseille will do me a lot of good. My love to Mother, Victoria, Jamil and Mary and of course to yourself. I shall take a few days off and will write you a more detailed letter. The S-G will return to New York after tomorrow. The news from Katanga this evening is quite bad. I hope things improve. Love, Peter
Boat rides on the Congo River, Peter Hazou and family, 1961
Peter Hazou, Congo, 1961
First page of Lovanium Operation report from Hazou, who did tremendous work to organize all the details for the Lovanium conference to happen, dated 23 August 1961, with photo and ONUC Lovanium pass. Hazou worked for the United Nations for over three decades, from 1947 until 1978.
Peter and Winnie Hazou at left, with Sergeant Harold Julien second from right. This is likely the photo of the Indian Officer’s cocktail party mentioned in the letter, it is undated. The son of Winnie Hazou recalls: “She told me that she told Harry [Julien] at the reception how very lucky he was to be going on the mission to Katanga with the S-G”.
Hazou with unidentified person, possibly at same Indian Officer’s Party.
Invitation to the reception for Dag Hammarskjold, at La Deviniere, 15 September 1961
At reception for Hammarskjold, on the terrace at La Deviniere, Peter and Winnie with unidentified person.
La Deviniere terrace, Peter and Winnie Hazou, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, and S. Habib Ahmed
Here is the reverse of the last photo, which is dated in arabic 16 September 1961. Though she writes in the letter to Abboud that the reception for Hammarskjold was on the 15th, Winnie Hazou told her family later on that the reception was the night before the flight, the 16th, which also contradicts the date on the invitation, but the days leading up to the flight were intense with fighting, so it’s very possible that the date was moved at the last minute.
Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, far left, with Peter Hazou on right, at Ndjili airport, Leopoldville, to transfer the 16 fallen to the Pan-Am plane.
Leopoldville, Pan-Am transport of fallen
The son of Peter and Winnie was only four years old at the time of the crash, but he remembers how he heard the news about Hammarskjold. He was at a luncheon for wives of diplomats with his mother, when the news came that Hammarskjold’s plane was announced missing, and the luncheon ended abruptly. He knew that something was wrong when his father came home in the middle of the day, which was very unusual for him. And then he saw his parents crying together. When the bodies of the fallen arrived in Leopoldville, he was on the observation deck at Ndjili airport with his family, and still recalls the intense sadness and solemnity of the people around him.
It took many people to run the United Nations Operation in the Congo, and I am glad to pay tribute to the memory of a colleague of Vlado, who no doubt grieved his death as well.